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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The influenza pandemic 
 
Of the common pandemic pathogens, influenza viruses remain a serious cause of morbidity 
every year worldwide, which, due to the structure and animal host range of one of its sub-
types, may evolve into a subtype which can cause a global epidemic. 
 
An influenza pandemic occurs when a reassortment of genes between human and avian influ-
enza virus strains takes place, for which mankind is susceptible.  
When a new influenza virus subtype having the capacity to cause influenza pandemic appears, 
no one in the population is immune against either haemagglutinin (H) or neuraminidase (N), 
or in the worst case, against both of the virus surface antigens. When this occurs, the range of 
population groups at risk, and in need of protection, will be expanded considerably.  
 
Influenza pandemics are likely to have severe public health and economic implications. In 
1918, the pandemic, so-called “Spanish flu” due to the death of a member of the Spanish 
Royal Family and intense reporting by the Spanish media, caused about 20 million deaths 
worldwide. On average pandemics causing high morbidity and mortality occurred every 25 
years during the last century, whereas the last pandemic took place more than 30 years ago. 
 
Elaborated in 1997 and revisited in 2001, the Hungarian pandemic preparedness plan needed 
to be reviewed in keeping with the documents that were adopted by the World Health Assem-
bly as well as the guide published by the European Union on 23 December 2004 (Commis-
sion Working Document on Community Influenza Pandemic Preparedness and Response 
planning).  
 
In preparation for influenza pandemics, certain Member States have developed systems of 
national influenza pandemic planning based on the WHO guidelines adopted in 1999. Be-
cause of the characteristics of pandemics, however, and the special features of the European 
Union area in which people, animals and products circulate freely, the question of the need 
for Community action to co-ordinate preparedness and response in the EU had become criti-
cal. 
 
From the point of view of animal health, mention must be made of Council Directive 
92/40/EEC introducing Community measures for the control of avian influenza, which 
defines the Community control measures to be applied by Member States’ competent 
authorities in the event of an outbreak of avian influenza. Furthermore, the Commission urges 
Member States to step up surveillance of avian influenza and to introduce strict measures in 
order to prevent animal-to-human spread of the disease. 
 
 
Advance preparation for the pandemic will create the groundwork for effective response, for 
decreasing morbidity and mortality related to the influenza epidemic to the smallest possible 
level and for preventing disruptions in delivering health care to the population. 
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Overarching goal of the National Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Plan 
 
The overarching goals of the Plan are to 
 
? Inform measures of preparedness for the influenza planning; 
? Put in place and make ready for deployment a well established response mechanism to 
contain and eradicate the pandemic and to see to it that cases presenting in masses are 
provided appropriate health care; 
? Ensure that planned actions and measures contribute to decreasing the number of influ-
enza cases, cases with complications and deaths; 
? Promote, on the basis of a communications plan, information of the public at large and 
healthcare workers on issues related to the pandemic, prevention of panic and active in-
volvement of the public in implementing preventive measures; 
? Attain, through the implementation of actions and measures set forth in the plan, that the 
country’s national economy continues to be operational, its public administration is main-
tained and its national security and defence are ensured. 
 
The objectives of the Plan are to  
 
? Ensure that estimates based on statistics and preliminary forecasts make it possible to as-
sess the expected magnitude of cases during a potential pandemic, to define the size of 
population groups at risk due to their health status, to identify the occupational groups to 
be protected with a view to maintaining the economic viability of the country and to de-
fine the number of individuals in those groups; 
? Identify the specific measures to be taken during the preparedness period, the public 
health institutional, material and human resources as well as organisational and informa-
tion systems needed to contain and eradicate the pandemic; 
? Inform the advance elaboration of measures that are required to contain the pandemic and 
will need to be imposed in the event of a pandemic, and inform the coordination of inter-
sectoral division of tasks; 
? Define conditions for the supply of a new vaccine needed for mass vaccination, promote 
fast-track licensing of the vaccine, setting medical priorities in vaccine use and outlining 
rules of vaccine distribution; 
? Promote elaboration of guidelines for the prevention of the disease and treatment of cases, 
for the period between the launch of vaccine production and beginning of vaccination with 
the vaccine produced; 
? Develop actions and measures to be taken in order to control and contain the disease in a 
breakdown by the individual phases of the pandemic as defined by WHO, and identify the 
actions to be taken by the agency and organisations concerned in the eradication of the 
epidemic; 
? Link the technical management scheme of epidemic eradication at the national, regional 
and local levels to the disaster management command and control systems at the Govern-
mental and sectoral levels; provide the basis for multisectoral cooperation required to con-
tain and eradicate the epidemic; 
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? Ensure that the costs required to prevent and contain the outbreak as well as budgetary 
allocations needed may be planned for in advance; 
? Facilitate harmonisation of domestic activities with actions taken by WHO, the EU and 
other international organisations; 
? Promote preparation of communications concerning the pandemic according the individ-
ual pandemic phases taking into account specific target groups. 
 
  
Impact of the pandemic on the healthcare system 
 
In the event of an influenza pandemic, if preventive measures fail to control and contain 
spread of the infection, and when high morbidity rates are seen, there will be a significant 
excess need for care at all sectors and levels of the healthcare delivery system (outpatient ser-
vices, specialist services, inpatient care, as well as rescue and patient transportation services). 
 
Primary health care will see cases in the highest numbers. In addition to overcrowded family 
practitioners’ offices and clinics, the number of home calls and visits may increase considera-
bly. This may be further increased if, for considerations of preventing the spread of infection, 
health authorities urge that preference be given to providing care at patients’ homes. 
 
The emergency ambulance services will have to expect both emergency medical care and pa-
tient transportation activities in volumes many times exceeding the average on an ongoing 
basis. During a pandemic, alternative ambulance and patient transportation service providers 
will have to expect significant excess demands. 
 
Inpatient facilities will need to put in place and operate capacities to accommodate patients 
with infectious diseases, beyond 100 percent utilisation of infectious disease wards and ser-
vices, in the event of a failure to contain further increases in morbidity by applying preventive 
measures. 
 
Depending on the appearance of expected complications, intensive care capacities will have to 
meet significant excess needs, even if the totality of intensive care capacities would be de-
ployed to care of influenza cases. 
 
The potential pandemic will have a fundamental impact on the professional operation of inpa-
tient care institutions. In keeping with the provisions outlined in emergency health plans, dur-
ing the pandemic period only patients who are absolutely in need of inpatient care may con-
tinue to be in hospitals and only such patients may be admitted. Non life-saving interventions 
and examinations should be postponed until the pandemic has subsided, and all efforts should 
be made to ensure that the length of stay of justified cases does not exceed the medically ac-
ceptable minimum number of days.  
 
Executives of healthcare institutions will need to take account of growing demands on radio-
logical diagnostic and laboratory units, due to cases with complications. 
 
In order to contain the spread of the epidemic, hospital visiting will have to be prohibited, 
which may result in a further disruptive impact on patient care as there might be an increased 
volume of phone calls to inquire about patients by relatives and next-of-kin denied access to 
the institutions.  
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The situation may be worsened by the need to expect that despite timely vaccination of 
healthcare workers in contact with patients, some of them might become ill and temporarily 
absent from work.  
 
If an epidemic of emergency nature develops and when prevention fails to be effective 
enough, support by the civil sector will assume greater significance. Retired healthcare work-
ers, volunteers of charity and faith-based organisations as well as students at various health 
training facilities may be involved in delivering health care, on a voluntary basis.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
ORGANISATIONS WITH PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR PANDEMIC 
PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE AND THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THEIR 
INVOLVEMENT 
 
Responding to and containing the influenza pandemic or an epidemic emergency are primar-
ily the tasks of the healthcare sector from a technical point of view; however, the health sector 
in itself is not able to address all consequences and issues related to the epidemic. For prepar-
edness and containment to be effective and efficient, the joint efforts and involvement of 
Government and society are required. 
 
Organisations of Government control: 
 
—  the Governmental Coordinating Committee (GCC) 
GCC Operative Staff (OpS) 
—  Ministry of Health (MoH) 
 
Healthcare organisations in charge of pandemic preparedness and response: 
 
— Outbreak Assistance Working Party (OAWP) 
— National Influenza Pandemic Prevention Task Force (NIPPTF) 
— National Public Health and Medical Officers’ Service (NPHMOS) 
Office of the Chief Medical Officer (OCMO) 
National Epidemiological Centre (NEC) 
County (Budapest Metropolitan) and municipal (metropolitan district) institutes of 
the National Public Health and Medical Officers’ service 
— Hungarian National Ambulance and Emergency Service (HNAES) 
— healthcare institutions. 
 
Organisations collaborating in pandemic preparedness and response pursuant to effec-
tive legislation: 
 
— Ministry of Agriculture and Regional Development (MARD) 
 Animal Health Authority 
—  Ministry of Environment Protection and Water Management 
— County (Budapest Metropolitan) and municipal (metropolitan district) defence commit-
tees 
— Ministry of the Interior 
National Directorate-General for Disaster Management of the Ministry of the Inte-
rior (NDGDM) 
Civil protection services 
National Police Headquarters (NPH) 
the Border Guard 
— Ministry of Defense 
   Hungarian Army 
—  Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
—  Ministry of Education 
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The legal framework of pandemic preparedness and response: 
 
Pandemic preparedness and response are provided for in the Health Law, in effective pieces 
of legislation concerning disaster medical services and contingency planning of healthcare 
institutions; concerning infectious diseases and response to and control of epidemics; con-
cerning disaster management, as well as other legal instruments of state administration. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
PANDEMIC PHASES IN RELATION TO HUNGARY, IN KEEPING WITH WHO’S 
DEFINITION 
 
The National Influenza Pandemic Plan will be implemented as required by the epidemiologi-
cal situation, which may be divided into the following phases, taking into account the World 
Health Organisation’s Global Influenza Preparedness Plan, published in April 2005 
(WHO/CDS/CSR/GIP/2005.5): 
 
INTERPANDEMIC PERIOD 
PHASE 1  No new influenza virus subtypes have been detected in humans. An in-
fluenza virus subtype that has caused human infection may be present in 
animals. If present in animals, the risk of human infection or disease is 
considered to be low. 
PHASE 2  No new influenza virus subtypes have been detected in humans. How-
ever, a circulating animal influenza virus subtype poses a substantial risk 
of human disease. 
 
PANDEMIC ALERT PERIOD 
PHASE 3  Human infection(s) with a new subtype, but no human-to-human spread, 
or at most rare instances of spread to a close contact. 
 
PHASE 4  Small cluster(s) with limited human-to-human transmission but spread is 
highly localized, suggesting that the virus is not well adapted to humans 
 
PHASE 5 Larger cluster(s) but human-to-human spread still localized, suggesting 
that the virus is becoming increasingly better adapted to humans, but may 
not yet be fully transmissible. 
 
PANDEMIC PERIOD 
PHASE 6 New influenza virus subtype spreads with increased and sustained trans-
mission in general population. 
Level 6/a  Spread of the new influenza virus subtype in initially affected 
country. 
Level 6/b New influenza virus subtype appears in other countries.  
Level 6/c New influenza virus subtype appears in Europe. 
Level 6/d First verified cases caused by the new influenza virus subtype 
in Hungary. 
Level 6/e New subtype causes regional outbreak in Hungary. 
Level 6/f New subtype causes national outbreak in Hungary. 
Level 6/g First wave of pandemic subsides in Hungary.  
Level 6/h Second/third wave of pandemic in Hungary. 
 
POSTPANDEMIC PERIOD 
Return to interpandemic period. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
PREPAREDNESS PERIOD 
 
The preparedness period includes phases 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the pandemic according to 
WHO’s categorisation.  
 
INTERPANDEMIC PERIOD 
 
PHASE 1  
 
No new influenza virus subtypes have been detected in humans. An influenza virus sub-
type that has caused human infection may be present in animals. If present in animals, the 
risk of human infection or disease is considered to be low. 
 
Objectives: 
 
1. To develop and maintain national influenza pandemic contingency plans which are 
in harmony with international plans. 
2. To promote national capacity to respond to early reports of new influenza virus 
strains. 
3. To develop effective mechanisms for mobilization and rapid deployment of re-
sources to areas of need. 
4. To develop effective mechanisms for decision-making and subsequent actions re-
garding national and international responses to influenza related health emergencies, 
by strengthening intersectoral and intergovernmental cooperative arrangements. 
 
Actions: 
 
? Operated by the Ministry of Health, the Outbreak Assistance Working Party (OAWP) 
meets at least twice every year, in keeping with its Rules of Procedures. During its meetings, 
OAWP reviews the country’s epidemiological situation and discusses current issues and 
tasks related to pandemic preparedness. 
 
The head of OAWP may order a pandemic exercise, taking into account the annual plan of 
action of the Governmental Coordinating Committee (GCC) as well as the annual exercise 
plan of the Health Security Committee (HSC) of the EU Directorate General for Health.  
 
? The Chief Medical Officer in his capacity of deputy head of OAWP will operate the 
National Influenza Pandemic Prevention Task Force (NIPPTF) as an interdisciplinary tech-
nical subcommittee of OAWP. 
NIPPTF will hold its meetings with a frequency and at dates set by the Chief Medical Offi-
cer as required by the tasks to be accomplished, and shall make recommendations and pro-
vide advice concerning preparedness.  
 
? The Ministry of Health (MoH) shall inform GCC on the process of preparedness in the 
frames of the annual reports. 
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? MoH, with the collaboration of the Office of the Chief Medical Officer (OCMO) shall en-
sure the availability of vaccines needed for free-of-charge vaccination against seasonal in-
fluenza and shall see to it that population groups at high risk are vaccinated. 
 
In Hungary, the National Epidemiological Centre is in charge of epidemiological surveillance; as part 
of this, it  
? maintains a surveillance service in periods of seasonal influenza. 
? assesses morbidity of influenza-like disease on an ongoing basis. 
? during the operation of the surveillance service, issues a weekly report not later than 
12 noon on each Wednesday. 
? monitors the spread of influenza viruses and the rapid identification of pathogens re-
sponsible for influenza-like disease. 
− studies resistance to antivirals 
− ensures supply of reagents to regional virological laboratories 
− liaises with the European Influenza Surveillance Scheme (EISS) and WHO 
− forwards isolated strains to WHO to allow for monitoring of changes in antigene 
structure 
− collaborates with animal health organisation in order to exchange information and 
isolated strains. 
Maintaining the avian surveillance scheme is the task of the Ministry of Agriculture and Re-
gional Development (MARD), which provides information to OCMO-NEC on an ongoing 
basis. 
 
? OCMO updates guidelines concerning influenza with the involvement of NEC.  
? Inpatient institutions develop and regularly update institutional influenza pandemic 
plans in order to supplement the epidemic preparedness planning section of their re-
spective contingency plans.  
? The supplements to the institutional contingency plans are reviewed and approved by 
the competent medical officers. 
 The executive management of healthcare institutions must ensure that the institutional 
contingency plan is regularly updated. The updating exercise is reviewed and con-
trolled by the competent county (Budapest Metropolitan) chief medical officer, who 
initiates repeated coordination with other involved agencies at the regional defence 
committee, as appropriate.  
? It must be ensured that healthcare workers are properly informed and advised about 
pandemics during the interpandemic period. This takes place in the form of continuing 
education courses, professional journal, publications, conferences and internet web-
sites. 
 
In the course of preparedness, but also during the period of response, communications at ap-
propriate levels, with adequate messages and of sufficient duration are of equal value and im-
portance as are technical activities, in order to maintain regular contacts with all target groups.  
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Communications during the period 
National Information Strategy 
Information to professional and technical staff 
? Familiarization with pandemic plan and related activities 
? Preparation of information materials (CD-ROM) that will be disseminated by profes-
sionals on the basis of common criteria 
? Prepare public health and medical officers’ service and family practitioners. 
 
Information to the public 
? Direct communication (professionals at NPHMOS, family practitioners, website etc.) 
? Indirect communication (media, radio, television, newspapers, electronic media). 
? Publications (leaflets and brochures). 
Detailed elaboration and development of materials will take place on an ongoing basis. 
 
Communication infrastructure 
In order to implement the information strategy, the following infrastructure network is avail-
able: 
— e-mail, intranet, internet, telephone, fax. 
 
Websites 
Health and medical websites that are available include the homepage of the Ministry of 
Health — www.eum.hu; the health information system of the Ministry of Health — 
www.drinfo.eum.hu; the homepage of NPHMOS — www.antsz.hu; and the homepage of the 
National Epidemiological Centre — www.oek.hu. 
In order to enhance communication efforts towards the population at large, contacts should be 
taken up and possibilities of collaboration should be explored and developed with non-
governmental organisations (Red Cross, charity organisations, churches, students of health 
training schools etc.), as a result of which it is expected that the number of websites in support 
of our communication will grow. 
Information network among senior response stakeholders 
Minister of Health, Deputy Secretary of State of the Ministry of Health (head of OAWP), 
Hungary’s Chief Medical Officer (deputy head of OAWP), Deputy Chief Medical Officer, 
Director-General of the National Epidemiological Centre, Head of the Department of Epide-
miology at the Office of the Chief Medical Officer. 
 
Communication channel towards the EU and WHO 
Formal communication links with the EU and WHO will be maintained by the National Epi-
demiological Centre and MoH.  
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Risk communication 
In accordance with their risk assessment and evaluation, OAWP, OCMO and NEC will pro-
vide information on the risk of potential infection, on recommended, required and mandated 
preventive and other actions, on an ongoing basis. 
 
Population feedback 
Identifying civil organisations, establishing links with them and capitalising on the possibili-
ties of collaboration are underway. 
In the course of informing the media, and through them, the public at large, special attention 
should be paid to make sure that appropriate stress is put on making a clear differentiation 
between ‘traditional influenza’ and avian influenza, as well as between epidemic and pan-
demic. 
 
PHASE 2  
 
No new influenza virus subtypes have been detected in humans. However, a circulating 
animal influenza virus subtype poses a substantial risk of human disease. 
? MoH takes action with Government to make available budgetary resources re-
quired for preparedness 
? OCMO draws up plan for distribution of vaccines and medicinal products that will 
become necessary if a pandemic occurs 
? OCMO, with the involvement of Hungary’s Chief Pharmaceutical Officer, plans 
expected needs of supplies from other medicinal products required for the treat-
ment of influenza cases if a pandemic occurs and explores arrangements to meet 
such needs. 
? NEC ensures procurement of pandemic virus strain appropriate for the production 
of the new vaccine. To this end, it gets into contact with the National Institute for 
Biological Standards and Control (NIBSC, UK).  
? The Ministry, with the involvement of the Chief Medical Officer, takes measures 
to ensure the adequacy of the process of domestic manufacturing and marketing of 
the pandemic vaccine and medicinal product. 
? OCMO prepares preliminary cost estimates for financing vaccines and medicinal 
products that will become necessary if a pandemic occurs. 
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PANDEMIC ALERT PERIOD 
PHASE 3  
Human infection(s) with a new subtype, but no human-to-human spread, or at most rare 
instances of spread to a close contact. 
? Following announcement by WHO, the National Influenza Pandemic Prevention Task 
Force will, upon initiative of the Chief Medical Officer, define current actions to be 
taken. 
? OAWP reviews activities and measures of pandemic response that necessitate the 
collaboration of organisations in other sectors. 
? The Administrative Secretary of State of the Ministry of Health advises the chair-
man of GCC to see to it that the Border Guard, the Hungarian Customs and Fi-
nance Guard and the NDGDM start preparing for collaboration with the health authority 
and begin preparedness in order to discharge their duties during a pandemic. 
? NEC continues (epidemiological and virological) routine surveillance. 
? NEC monitors incoming or obtained international information, and updates the Chief 
Medical Officer as deputy head of OAWP on an ongoing basis. 
? From the date of announcement by WHO, the Ministry, OCMO, and NEC provide regular 
information to professional and technical organisations and the public at large on the 
situation as it evolves, as well as on measures and actions taken and planned. 
? NPHMOS institutions collaborate closely with animal health authorities. 
As part of this: 
− they monitor potential outbreaks of influeanza-like diseases on poultry farms  
− should it come to killing and destruction of poultry holdings, they provide technical 
support in order to ensure the protection of persons carrying out the task and to en-
force public health requirements. 
 
PHASE 4  
Small cluster(s) with limited human-to-human transmission but spread is highly local-
ized, suggesting that the virus is not well adapted to humans 
 
 
PHASE 5 
Larger cluster(s) but human-to-human spread still localized, suggesting that the virus is 
becoming increasingly better adapted to humans, but may not yet be fully transmissible. 
 
Actions in Phases 4 and 5 
? NIPPTF reviews and evaluates preparedness status (stocks of drugs for chemoprophylaxis, 
availability of monovalent vaccine etc.) and makes proposal to the head of OAWP regard-
ing necessary actions. 
? The Chief Medical Officer takes initiative at MoH to obtain budgetary resources in 
order to allow for the implementation of actions and measures as identified in the 
Pandemic Preparedness Plan and falling within the ambit of NPHMOS. 
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? MoH, with due regard to the levels of phases, immediately informs NEC on the 
contents of documents concerning influenza that it received from the EU as well as 
from the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
? NIPPTF holds extended meeting with heads and epidemiologists of county institutes of 
NPHMOS attending in order to clarify and fine-tune tasks of pandemic preparedness and 
response. 
? The National Institute of Inventory Management reviews stockpiles of pharmaceu-
ticals, supplies of health materials and equipment in the National Medical Stock-
piles which may be deployed to support healthcare institutions in the event of a 
? 
? es, without 
ted to diseases that might be imported 
? 
luenza, at the designated border crossing stations and points. 
iological situation in the 
? 
?  OCMO provide regular information and updates to healthcare providers 
? approaches Government to request that funds are released to allow the pro-
? sponse and protec-
n representations. 
pandemic, and reports the quantities and availabilities to the Ministry. 
NPHMOS coordinates and clarifies with NDGDM the scope of tasks that require the 
involvement of disaster management agencies. 
NEC continues routine surveillance, furthermore, NPHMOS introduc
any delay, epidemiological measures concerning persons coming from the country 
of origin of the new virus subtype and rela
from said country. 
NPHMOS, in collaboration with the Border Guard, implements controls of persons 
coming from areas of outbreak, the identification and isolation of persons sus-
pected of having inf
? NEC evaluates, on an ongoing basis, incoming international data and other epide-
miological information concerning Hungary and Europe, including information re-
ceived from the medical services of the Hungary Army. 
? County institutes of NPHMOS enhance virological surveillance and implement a 
50% increase in virological sampling within the influenza surveillance scheme in 
all ages and regions, regardless of the current epidem
country. 
NPHMOS designates healthcare institutions for the provision of care to suspected 
cases of influenza identified at border crossing stations and points.  
MoH and
and the media, on the basis of information received about the outbreak of influ-
enza. 
? OCMO takes the necessary measures to ensure that the production of a new vac-
cine against the pandemic virus provided by WHO is launched. 
MoH 
duction of the new vaccine in order to protect the population.  
MoH informs public at large of the epidemic threat, on what re
tion measures to take and on the arrangements for vaccine production and distribu-
tion. 
? MoH provides technical support to MoFA to organise protection of staff at foreign 
representations from the outbreak, and makes vaccines available for use in staff at 
foreig
? Ministry of Education collaborates in order to ensure that information leaflets and 
brochures on influenza made available by NEC are disseminated to educational in-
stitutions. 
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CHA E
THE PAN
ype spreads with increased and sustained transmission in gen-
opulation. 
btype in initially affected country. 
l influenza period, 
nza surveillance. 
? fluenza-like cases with 
c. 
ck-
? 
tion in healthcare workers, until such 
? 
 
 
Level 6/d First verified cases caused by the new influenza virus subtype in Hungary. 
evel 6/e New subtype causes regional outbreak in Hungary. 
PT R FIVE 
DEMIC PERIOD 
PHASE 6 
New influenza virus subt
eral p
The pandemic period is subdivided into different levels according to the geographical 
area that are affected by the outbreak. 
Level 6/a  Spread of the new influenza virus su
Level 6/b New influenza virus subtype appears in other countries.  
Level 6/c New influenza virus subtype appears in Europe. 
lance. ? NEC enhances integrated epidemiological and virological surveil
seasona? When the virus subtype appears in Europe outside the 
the Chief Medical Officer issues orders to activate influe
? NPHMOS, in collaboration with the Border Guard, heightens controls of persons 
coming from areas of epidemic threat, the identification and isolation of persons 
suspected of having influenza, at border crossing stations. 
? NPHMOS extends notification requirement of respiratory infection outbreaks and 
orders specially prompt reporting of severe acute respiratory diseases. 
NPHMOS orders that virological tests be carried out in in
fatal outcome occurring in hospitals. 
? NIPPTF holds extended meeting with heads and epidemiologists of county insti-
tutes of NPHMOS attending in order to clarify and fine-tune new measures. 
? The ministry orders, through the Chief Medical Officer, that the bed volume of in-
fectious disease wards be specified that are available for the treatment of influenza 
cases and that may be reassigned temporarily for the duration of the pandemi
? OCMO reviews and updates the plan for distributing vaccines required to vacci-
nate high-risk population groups and population groups to be provided increased 
protection. Furthermore, it reviews and updates the therapeutic antivirals sto
piles and specifies distribution plans. 
NPHMOS orders that vaccination of healthcare workers and essential workers in 
essential services shall begin, and in the event of the non-availability of the neces-
sary vaccines, the launch of antiviral preven
time as vaccination may begin. 
OCMO, with the collaboration of NEC, takes the necessary steps to ensure that di-
agnosticals are procured in the necessary quantities and regional laboratories are 
supplied with reagents.  
? Following announcement of the appearance in Europe of the virus, the Minister of 
Health and the Chief Medical Officer hold joint press conference. 
L
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Level 6/f New subtype causes national outbreak in Hungary. 
? The Chief Medical Officer  
- if necessary, considers limiting public gatherings, such as schools and amuse-
ne should be distributed and delivered. 
? 
? 
isation and antigenic structure and genetic characterisation of strains. 
FO, the intranet 
? 
lth emergency in 
? 
ent 
? 
sting international assistance, 
ir infectious disease care capacities by putting in extra beds, making 
ons 
ts at medical and health training institutions are dis-
patched to healthcare institutions by NPHMOS. 
ment places 
- orders that vaccination of at-risk groups should begin, and free-of-charge in-
fluenza vacci
- orders the distribution of preventive and antiviral preparations needed for the 
treatment of cases. 
NPHMOS introduces expansion of data provision by influenza reporting system to 
include daily reporting of the number of deaths from influenza-like diseases and 
number of influenza positive cases. 
? Upon initiative of the chief medical officer, the Administrative Secretary of State 
of MoH advises the head of the GCC to mobilize OAWP. He will inform the head of 
GCC Operative Staff without any delay that OAWP has been mobilized. 
? The head of OAWP mobilizes OAWP and begins operative management of epidemic re-
sponse. OAWP shall be extended by members of NIPPTF, and it assesses and evaluates 
the situation as it evolves and takes measures with a frequency as set by the head of 
OAWP. 
NPHMOS heightens its laboratory capacities in order to be able to carry out, in all 
cases, typ
? OCMO provides information and updates on the epidemic situation and measures 
taken to relevant international organisations on an ongoing basis. 
? NPHMOS provides continuous information on domestic and international epi-
demic situation to the profession and the public at large via EPIN
network of NPHMOS and via the internet. MoH and NPHMOS hold regular press 
conferences on the development of the epidemiological situation. 
If made necessary by the course of the epidemic, upon initiative of the chief medi-
cal officer, the Minister of Health may declare state of public hea
counties affected by the outbreak or for the entire territory of the country, and in-
forms the president of GCC and the head of GCC Operative Staff accordingly. 
If the epidemic increases, the Minister of Health proposes to the Government, 
upon the initiation of the head of OAWP and with the agreement of the presid
of GCC, the declaration of epidemic emergency. 
In the event that international assistance becomes necessary, the minister of health 
proposes to the Government the initiation of reque
? The dispatching unit of HNAES is tasked with setting rescue and patient transportation as-
signments for ambulance and rescue organisations and patient transportation businesses 
outside HNAES. 
? Healthcare institutions deliver their activities in keeping with their contingency plans. 
They increase the
beds available through discharges, temporary profile modification, limiting of admissi
while applying specific priorities, rescheduling elective interventions and by reassigning 
staff. 
If necessary, retired physicians and allied health personnel who volunteered in ad-
vance are called in to work. 
Individually reporting volunteers or voluntary nursing personnel from charity or-
ganisations as well as studen
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? 
ay be released to hospitals from the National Medical 
? 
urchase of drugs etc.). 
es the necessary measures, 
? 
? aceutical Officer monitors the provision of vaccine supplies to 
? ng care and the pub-
 
e recovery period, unlike other emergen-
cies, includes activities of preparedness for a subsequent pandemic wave, in addi-
ormal situation. 
 
POSTPAN
? e Minister 
of Health declares lifting of a status of public health emergency and the Govern-
paredness. 
MoH, through NPHMOS, issues orders to hospitals to report free bed capacities, 
as well as free capacities of priority health technology need to treat influenza 
cases, on a daily basis. 
? The National Institute of Inventory Management operates a continuous on-call 
service in order to ensure that medical supplies and equipment required in the 
treatment of patients m
Stockpiles without any delay. 
MoH invites Hungarian Red Cross, as well as civil and faith-based charity organi-
sations to enhance their attention and assistance activities towards elderly persons 
in need of support (shopping, p
? The Chief Pharmaceutical Officer (CPO) monitors continuously the turnover and 
stocks of medicinal drugs and antivirals needed to treat influenza and its complica-
tions. In order to ensure seamless supply, CPO tak
makes proposals and provides regular update on them to OAWP. 
County (Budapest Metropolitan) chief medical officers, if necessary, prohibit visit-
ing in healthcare institutions, and urge patient care at home rather than in clinics or 
doctor’s offices. 
? NPHMOS issues orders to provide vaccination to those who have not been vacci-
nated yet, with due regard to priorities set. 
The Chief Pharm
the network of retail pharmacies, on an ongoing basis.  
NPHMOS ensures continuously that those involved in deliveri
lic at large are provided information and teaching, and that regular communication 
activities are maintained. 
? Psychological and spiritual support is provided to address increased physical, psy-
chological and biological stress on staff involved in pandemic response and con-
trol activities. 
? If necessary, NPH collaborates in implementing and enforcing epidemiological 
measures issued by the health authority. 
Level 6/g First wave of pandemic subsides in Hungary.  
In the event of an influenza pandemic, th
tion to activities related to end of events and return to n
DEMIC PERIOD; END OF THE FIRST WAVE OF PANDEMIC IN HUNGARY 
As proposed by OAWP, NPHMOS declares the end of the epidemic, th
ment declares the end of an epidemic emergency.  
? OAWP, NPHMOS and NEC assess and evaluate experiences gained and lessons 
learnt with epidemic control and response, based on which they will update and 
reassess the tasks and documents for subsequent pre
? NPHMOS and NEC carry out epidemiological analysis of the outbreak, and ana-
lyse data on morbidity, complications and mortality, on the basis of data by the 
Hungarian Central Statistical Office. 
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? NPHMOS takes measures to vaccinate persons at risk, but not yet vaccinated with 
monovalent vaccine, as well as to revaccinate chronic patients. 
The hospitals’ activities gradually res? ume regular operation characteristic of inter-
ne week following 
? 
ent, through GCC, on control and containment of the epi-
? 
as restocking the supplies used up from the from the National Medical 
? 
ding further actions and measures of preparedness. 
Leve
t pandemic wave are implemented. 
mic phase 
 
pandemic periods. Executive managements of the healthcare institutions assess 
and evaluate experiences gained during the epidemic within o
end of the outbreak, and take measures to review, and update as necessary, institu-
tional pandemic plans.  
OAWP prepares consolidated report for the Minister of Health, in which it evalu-
ates preparedness and actions and measures taken. Based on this report, the Minis-
ter informs the Governm
demic. 
The Minister of Health takes initiative with the Government to reimburse extra 
costs not yet compensated to those taking part in pandemic response and control, 
as well 
Stockpiles. 
In the postpandemic period, tasks in the preparedness period are put on the agenda. 
NIPPTF reviews issues concerning a possible second wave of the pandemic and makes 
proposals to OAWP regar
 
l 6/h Second/third wave of pandemic in Hungary. 
During a subsequent influenza pandemic, the actions and measures as defined in 
the firs
All other activities, evaluation and assessment exercise, reporting and notification 
as well as processing of experiences take place with identical objectives and con-
tents as was the case in the preceding pande
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CHAPTER SIX 
POSTPANDEMIC PERIOD 
The recovery period in the event of an influenza pandemic includes actions and meas-
ures to ensure return to the usual situation.  
? WHO declares end of the pandemic. 
? As proposed by OAWP, NPHMOS declares the end of the epidemic, the Minister 
of Health declares lifting of a status of public health emergency and the Govern-
ment declares the end of an epidemic emergency.  
? OAWP, NPHMOS and NEC assess and evaluate experiences gained and lessons 
learnt with epidemic control and response, based on which they will update and 
reassess the tasks and documents for subsequent preparedness. 
? NPHMOS and NEC carry out epidemiological analysis of the outbreak, and ana-
lyse data on morbidity, complications and mortality, on the basis of data by the 
Hungarian Central Statistical Office. 
? The hospitals’ activities gradually resume regular operation characteristic of inter-
pandemic periods. Executive managements of the healthcare institutions assess 
and evaluate experiences gained during the epidemic within one week following 
end of the outbreak, and take measures to review, and update as necessary, institu-
tional pandemic plans.  
? OAWP prepares consolidated report for the Minister of Health, in which it evalu-
ates preparedness and actions and measures taken. Based on this report, the Minis-
ter informs the Government, through GCC, on control and containment of the epi-
demic. 
? The Minister of Health takes initiative with the Government to reimburse extra 
costs not yet compensated to those taking part in pandemic response and control, 
as well as restocking the supplies used up from the from the National Medical 
Stockpiles. 
All other activities, evaluation and assessment exercise, reporting and notification 
as well as processing of experiences take place with identical objectives and con-
tents as was the case in the pandemic phase 3.  
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ACRONYMS 
 
 
English Hungarian 
NIPPP National Influenza Pandemic Prepar-
edness Plan 
NIPT Nemzeti Influenza Pandémiás Terv 
EU European Union EU Európai Unió 
WHO  World Health Organisation EVSZ Egészségügyi Világszervezet 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NATO Észak-atlanti Szerződés Szervezete 
GCC Governmental Coordinating Commit-
tee  
KKB Kormányzati Koordinációs Bizottság 
OpS GCC Operative Staff  
 
OpT Operatív Törzs 
MoH Ministry of Health EüM Egészségügyi Minisztérium 
OAWP Outbreak Assistance Working Party  
 
JVM Járványügyi Védekezési Munkabi-
zottság 
NIPPTF National Influenza Pandemic Preven-
tion Task Force  
NIPP Nemzeti Influenza Pandémia Preven-
ciós Bizottság 
OCMO Office of the Chief Medical Officer OTH Országos Tisztifőorvosi Hivatal 
NPHMOS National Public Health and Medical 
Officers’ Service 
ÁNTSZ Állami Népegészségügyi és Tisztior-
vosi Szolgálat 
NEC National Epidemiological Centre OEK Országos Epidemiológiai Központ 
HNAES Hungarian National Ambulance and 
Emergency Service 
OMSZ  Országos Mentőszolgálat 
NDGDM National Directorate-General for 
Disaster Management, Ministry of 
the Interior 
OKF BM Országos Katasztrófavédelmi 
Főigazgatóság 
NPH National Police Headquarters  ORFK  Országos Rendőrfőkapitányság 
EISS European Influenza Surveillance 
Scheme 
EISS Európai Influenza Surveillance 
Rendszer 
MARD  Ministry of Agriculture and Regional 
Development 
FVM Földművelési és Vidékfejlesztési 
Minisztérium 
MoFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs KÜM Külügyminisztérium 
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